Abstract: A false account of Marshall's engagements with the historical school is found among modern commentators. This false account involves the central proposition that
Purpose of this paper
What are the reason(s) for writing the paper or the aims of the research?
This paper counters the view that Alfred Marshall was an opponent of the historical school. This false account has survived and prospered because it has fitted into more general conceptions of intellectual history, held by both orthodox and heterodox economists.
Design/methodology/a pproach
How are the objectives to be achieved? Include the main method(s) used for the research. What is the approach to the topic and what is the theoretical or subject
Marshall's affinity with the historical school is established by examining his writings and his relationship with historical school sympathisers in Britain.
scope of the paper?
Findings
What was found in the course of the work? This will refer to analysis, discussion, or results.
It is established that Marshall regarded his work as building on historical school insights, and he repeatedly referred positively to the ideas of the German historical school. It is argued in this paper that Marshall's opposition to the historical school was confined to its antitheoretical wing, principally William Cunningham. In other important respects Marshall's position was compatible with German and British historicism.
What is original/value of paper
What is new in the paper? State the value of the paper and to whom.
In preceding literature, Marshall's affinities with the historical school have been denied, unacknowledged, or unexplored.
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Classification: Conceptual paper
This essay explains why Alfred Marshall has been misunderstood in some modern accounts of his relationship with the historical school. [1] These misunderstandings are so pervasive that a false account of Marshall's engagements with the historical school has emerged and spread among modern commentators. This false account involves the central proposition that
Marshall was an opponent of the historical school. For instance, Robert Skidelsky (1983, p. 43) stated that Marshall 'rejected the main contentions of the German historical school'.
Such statements are difficult to reconcile with the fact that Marshall in several places referred positively to members of the German historical school, in his Principles and elsewhere. In his 1979-81 lectures at the LSE, Lionel Robbins (1998, p. 306) attempted to explain away these little known positive comments. Robbins did so on the unsupported and implausible grounds that Marshall 'was in some sense terrified' of the German historicists.
However, the only instance that Robbins could cite of a disagreement between Marshall and any historicist was his altercation in Cambridge with William Cunningham. Furthermore, Robbins neglected to point out that in his debates with Cunningham, Marshall willingly accepted a core proposition of the historical school case and acknowledged the problem of historical specificity. This problem starts from the presumption that different socio-economic phenomena may require theories that are in some respects different from each other (Hodgson, 2001 ). Robbins blindly ignored the fact that Marshall (1949, p. 31) This false account has survived and prospered because it has fitted into more general conceptions of intellectual history, held by both orthodox and heterodox economists. To many orthodox economists, Marshall was a hero who greatly contributed to the development of neoclassical economic theory, and fought valiantly against the 'atheoretical' historicists at
Cambridge. Likewise, to many heterodox economists, Marshall was a villain who greatly contributed to the development of neoclassical economic theory, and machinated against the 'more realistic' historicists at Cambridge. The false account fits the prejudices on both sides.
However, this account does not stand up to minimal critical scrutiny. It is a fact that
Marshall openly and repeatedly praised and supported many of the ideas and leaders of the German historical school. Furthermore, he understood and addressed the problem of historical specificity in his writings. In other words, Marshall openly acknowledged that some economic systems in history might require some specific theories or principles to explain them that would not then apply to all economies.
As for the supporters of the historical school in Cambridge, the argument here is that that they were at least partly responsible for their own marginalisation. Marshall's times also have been misunderstood. It has become a commonplace to refer to the 1870s as the decade of 'the marginal revolution' in economic thought. Yet the more careful historians of ideas have shown clearly that it was less of a sudden revolution than an intermittent process, traceable back to the writings of a variety of economists working as early as the 1830s (Black et al., 1973; Howey, 1960; Ekelund and Hébert, 2002) . Furthermore, its impact was delayed. Prior to 1890, most of the published general histories of economic thought failed to mention the term 'marginal utility'. No written account of this supposed 'marginal revolution' in ideas appeared until well into the twentieth century.
For any informed economist working in the years from 1883 to 1914, the AustroGerman Methodenstreit was as recognisable and important an event as the latterly so-called 'marginal revolution'. Indeed, in retrospect, the deep methodological issues raised in this celebrated 'clash of methods' are even more momentous than the theoretical shift, pioneered by the marginalists, from cost-based to utility-based theories of price. [3] It's all in Marshall: His respect for the German historical school In contrast to modern dismissals, references to the German historical school throughout Marshall's writings are respectful and positive, rather than scornful or dismissive. [4] Emphatically, Marshall absorbed rather than rejected much of the doctrine of the German historical school (Hammond, 1991; Hutchison, 1998 [5] Nevertheless, Marshall's economic thought was more individualistic and utilitarian than that of most German historicists. Many historical school economists had argued against the utilitarian view that human welfare could be equated with the satisfaction of subjective desires. However, even on this point, Marshall's position was characteristically conciliatory.
On the one hand, in his Principles, he described wealth as 'desirable things … which satisfy wants.' But on the other hand he admitted 'those elements of the wealth of a nation which are commonly ignored when estimating the wealth of the individuals composing it', including some of the 'non-material elements' stressed by 'German economists' (Marshall, 1949, pp. 45, 49 contrast] if the subject-matter of a science passes through different stages of development, the laws which apply to one stage will seldom apply without modification to others; the laws of science must have a development corresponding to that of the things of which they treat.
This is an unambiguous recognition of the problem of historical specificity. In this passage
Marshall recognises, like the German historicists, that 'laws which apply to one stage' of economic development 'will seldom apply without modification to others'. Likewise, in his
Principles -the first edition of which appeared in 1890 - Marshall (1949, pp. 30-31) acknowledged Marshall fully acknowledged the problem of historical specificity but he did not make a sustained attempt to resolve it. Instead he concentrated on the formulation of the seemingly universal Principles, for which he became famous.
Greedy for facts: But not by facts alone
Philosophically, Marshall was an admirer of Immanuel Kant. From a similar perspective,
Marshall recognised the limitations of all empirical enquiry. Kant (1929, p. 41 ) had argued in 1781 that 'though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience.' Accordingly, without dismissing empirical work, Marshall (1885, p. 171) recognised the need for additional, theoretical endeavour:
Greedy then as the economist must be for facts, he must not be content with mere facts. Boundless as must be his gratitude to the great thinkers of the historic school, he must be suspicious of any direct light that the past is said to throw on the problems of the present.
For Marshall, historical facts were essential, but they cannot on their own provide us with the answers (Marshall, 1949, p. 32) . Thus at once he paid unbounded tribute to the work of the historical school, but simultaneously undermined the naive empiricist views in their midst.
The naïve belief that facts alone were enough to derive universal principles was characteristic of the older historical school. But after the Methodenstreit many of the historicists took a more sophisticated view. Marshall was not attacking the historical school as a whole but the its surviving empiricist wing. Marshall (1885, p. 166 ) explained in his inaugural lecture that the mere observation of sequences of events explained nothing:
facts by themselves are silent. Observation discovers nothing directly of the actions of causes, but only of sequences in time. ... In economic or social problems no event has ever been the exact precedent of another. The conditions of human life are so various:
every event is the complex result of so many causes, so closely interwoven that the past can never throw a simple and direct light on the future.
Not only are facts unable to speak for themselves, but also the method of inductive inference is confounded by the complexity of economic phenomena. However, while showing that economics could not rely on induction alone, Marshall appealed to the authority of a leading and sophisticated member of the German historical school. In his Principles, Marshall (1949, p. 24) quoted and endorsed Schmoller's statement that: 'Induction and deduction are both needed for scientific thought as the left foot and the right foot are both needed for walking.' [6] Accordingly, Marshall tried to appeal to both sides in the induction versus deduction debate. Although he accepted deduction, he was quite cautious in introducing deductive arguments based on universal assumptions. The deductive core was to be confined to such universal forces as supply and demand. In his inaugural lecture Marshall (1885, pp. 158-9) saw the central and universal core of economic theory as a machinery to aid us in reasoning about those motives of human action which are measurable. ... But, while attributing this high and transcendent universality to the central scheme of economic reasoning, we may not assign any universality to economic dogmas. ... It is not a body of concrete truth, but an engine for the discovery of concrete truth ...
In his Principles, he outlined a similar idea. Appealing appropriately to biology, Marshall (1949, p. vii) suggested that amidst the historical or evolutionary variety found in economic and biotic phenomena, common features and principles might exist:
As, in spite of the great differences in form between birds and quadrupeds, there is one
Fundamental Idea running through all their frames, so the general theory of the equilibrium of demand and supply is a Fundamental idea running through the frames of all the various parts of the central problem of Distribution and Exchange.
For Marshall, some general principles were appropriate, corresponding to the elements that were common to diverse phenomena. He argued that the 'general theory of the equilibrium of demand and supply' formed an essential element of the deductive engine of economic theory.
However, he wished to restrain and complement this engine's powers. For instance, Marshall (1949, p. 638) warned that the function of analysis and deduction in economics is not to forge a few long chains of reasoning, but to forge rightly many short chains and single connecting links. ... as surely as every deduction must rest on the basis of inductions, so surely does every inductive process involve and include analysis and deduction.
As a result, deduction had to be restrained and limited by empirical anchors. On the other hand, Marshall argued that the danger in some work of the historical school was that, in placing an impossible faith in facts alone, they were inattentive to their own acts of classification and logic; and they ignored their own use of deductive reasoning.
When therefore it is said that a certain event in history teaches us this or that, an element of deductive reasoning is introduced, which is more likely to be fallacious the more persistently it is ignored. For the argument selects a few out of the group of conditions which were present when the event happened, and tacitly, if not unconsciously, assumes that the rest are irrelevant. The assumption may be justifiable:
but it often turns out to be otherwise. (Marshall, 1885, p. 166) As a result the most reckless and treacherous of all theorists is he who professes to let facts and figures speak for themselves, who keeps in the background the part he has played, perhaps unconsciously, in selecting and grouping them, and in suggesting the argument (Marshall, 1885, p. 168 The fact is I am the dull mean man, who holds Economics to be an organic whole, and has little respect for pure theory (otherwise than as a branch of mathematics or the science of numbers), as for that crude collection and interpretation of facts without the aid of high analysis which sometimes claims to be part of economic history. (Whitaker, 1996, vol. 2, p. 256) Clearly, Marshall was trying to steer a middle course between overly mathematical economic theory and banal empiricism. Marshall again wrote to Hewins on 29 May 1900:
Much of 'pure theory' seems to me to be elegant toying: I habitually describe my own pure theory of international trade as a 'toy'. I understand economic science to be the application of powerful analytical methods to unravelling the actions of economic and social causes, to assigning each its part, to tracing mutual interactions and modifications; and above all to laying bare the hidden causas causantes. (Whitaker, 1996, vol. 2, p. 280) Along very similar lines, Marshall wrote to Francis Edgeworth on 28 August 1902:
In my view 'Theory' is essential. … But I conceive no more calamitous notion than that abstract, or general, or 'theoretical' economics was economics 'proper.' It seems to me an essential but a very small part of economics proper: and by itself sometimes even -well, not a very good occupation of time. (Pigou, 1925, p. 437; Whitaker, 1996, vol. 2, p. 393) Sadly, a century later, the economics profession as a whole, including Marshall's own Faculty of Economics at the University of Cambridge, has become much preoccupied with the 'elegant toying' that Marshall had looked down upon so critically. The study of real causes within socio-economic systems, that Marshall saw as the essence of economic science, has become much less fashionable today than the exhibition of mathematical technique for its own sake.
True to his Kantian affections, Marshall saw the priority of such a theory over empirical enquiry. Rightly recognising the limitations of empiricism, he searched for an overarching conceptual framework within which he could build his theoretical system. He thought that he had found the answer in the 'synthetic philosophy' of Herbert Spencer. Marshall thus followed Schmoller and others in importing ideas from Spencerian biology and philosophy into economics (Pribram, 1983, p. 217) .
Even in biology, in the second half of the nineteenth century, Spencer rivalled Charles Darwin in standing. Trained in physics and mathematics, and being a brilliant polymath and synthesiser, Spencer made a significant contribution to biology and extended evolutionary ideas to ethics and social science. Spencer's unified system of ideas was popular and engaging. It seemed that the natural and social sciences could be unified on the basis of a few universal principles. Spencer too offered the lure of a general theory.
Marshall read his works avidly, incorporating several Spencerian notions into his economics (Hodgson, 1993; Thomas, 1991) . As Peter Groenewegen (1995, p. 167) has remarked: 'The significant influence of Spencer on Marshall's thinking cannot be repeated too often'. Spencer provided the key theoretical, or rather meta-theoretical, framework upon which Marshall attempted to build. It was thus a great tragedy for Marshall that Spencer's influence began to wane rapidly in the early years of the twentieth century (Hodgson, 1993) .
John Neville Keynes was an early pupil and devotee of Marshall. Keynes's Scope and
Method of Political Economy (1891) was largely an attempt to develop Marshall's methodology, particularly by trying to steer between induction and deduction, and between description and formalism. Marshall read the proofs of the book and was quite positive about them, although he urged that more attention should be given to contemporary German economists (Moggridge, 1997, pp. 355-6) . In his book, Keynes attempted to combine induction with deduction, arguing (p. 227) that economics 'must both begin with observation and end with observation'. Observation to establish premises, deduction to reach conclusions, observation once more to verify them. This work also claimed a continuity of doctrine between the Marshallians at Cambridge and what had gone before. The text minimised theoretical confrontation and tried to find the best in all points of view. Accordingly, it failed to resolve many of the outstanding questions of methodological controversy.
The Methodendiskurs: Marshall and the British historicists
Some members of the historical school in Britian were as misled by an empiricist epistemology as were their earlier co-thinkers in Germany. [7] Marshall countered them on this issue, promoting an ostensibly balanced position, with a role for both induction and deduction. He was careful to cite the authority of Schmoller on this point, and he recognised the value of the empirical work of the historical school. (Koot, 1987, ch. 6) . In 1901 Foxwell emphasised that 'in the economic region, all practical questions should be determined on their merits, after detailed and historical investigation of the particular circumstances, and not by summary reference to maxims or dogmas supposed to be of universal application.' [9] Nevertheless, this was not so far from the view of Marshall, and the two sometimes expressed their closeness on such matters. In their correspondence of 1897 on matters of method, Foxwell suggested to Marshall that J. N. Keynes's position was midway between that of Marshall and his own. Marshall (Whitaker, 1996, vol. 2, p. 179) (Maloney, 1985, pp. 99-105 Hence, according to the above statement, Cunningham's highly inadequate answer to the problem of historical specificity was that economists should be preoccupied with taxonomy.
For Cunningham, the main role of 'theory' was to taxonomise categories for the purposes of empirical research. He objected to the assumptions of neoclassical economics in the following terms:
The underlying assumption against which I wish to protest is ... That the same motives have been at work in all ages, and have produced similar results, and that, therefore, it is possible to formulate economic laws which describe the action of economic causes at all times and in all places. (Cunningham, 1892b, p. and by failing to recognise that even taxonomy requires some universal principles before it can proceed. Cunningham (1892a, p. 2) wrote: 'Economic doctrine about the actual world we live in is all built up as a branch of empirical knowledge; it has no universality.' Cunningham did not seem to realise that the negation of universality is itself a universal statement and that all empirical knowledge requires universal categories. Cunningham's extreme, untenable and self-contradictory empiricist position denied the very conceptual tools upon which all enquiry must proceed. Furthermore, Cunningham's criticisms of Marshall were so overstated and unconvincing that he became 'an outsider even among historical economists' such as Foxwell and William Ashley (Koot, 1987, p. 146 ).
Marshall (1892) March 1899 criticising those 'who are studying economic history as a mere series of facts' (Whitaker, 1996 vol. 2, p. 251) .
A pale shadow of the Austro-German Methodenstreit, this British altercation over methods left Cunningham isolated and Marshall in a much stronger position. On the question of historical specificity, Marshall had conceded to the historical school, but from a philosophical standpoint that was stronger than that of his principal British adversary. College, 'has publicly declared himself to be out of sympathy with the study of economics under the direction of this Board'. Accordingly, students preparing for the examinations in economics were advised to seek council elsewhere (Koot, 1987, p. 149; Kadish, 1989, p. 218) . The philosophical untenability of the empiricist position is not sufficiently emphasised in some modern accounts. Marshall was right to insist that empirical enquiry was impossible without theory, and that theory had priority. Like the astute historicists in Germany, Marshall had assimilated Menger's critique of empiricist historicism. So when he took dislike to some of the views of some of his historicist critics, it was their naïve empiricism rather than their historicism to which he primarily took exception. There is no major inconsistency between his public and his private persona here. Both his letters and his publications criticise empiricism, on the one hand, and praise the German historicist theorists, on the other. His tributes to the German historical school are repeated in his publications, up to and including the later editions of his Principles. [10] Neither is it accurate to characterise Marshall's methodological views as simply 'eclectic' with Marshall 'prepared to use any method that produced helpful and useful results' (Moggridge, 1997, p. 365) . On the contrary, Marshall's criticism of those who believed that theories could be spun from facts was relatively sophisticated for his time. Although
Marshall's drive for a robust economic theory was eventually harnessed by his more formalistic neoclassical successors, the choice in 1885 was largely between historically informed theory, on the one hand, and naïve empiricism, on the other. Marshall adopted the stronger philosophical position. The tragedy is that Marshall failed to develop a theoretical framework within which the full sweep of historical development and structural change could be accommodated.
In the It may be objected, however, that the net result of Marshall's particular efforts to assert the primacy of theory was to establish a neoclassical tradition that became progressively more formal, more technical, narrower and less historical. There is an element of truth here, but Marshall bears only part of the responsibility for the outcome. Crucially, despite his persistent recognition of the importance of the problem, Marshall never developed an adequate theoretical framework to deal with the issue of historical specificity. But other factors were beyond his control. In particular, the fragmented British historical school was much weaker than the German, and it lacked a sizeable cohort of methodologically and theoretically astute researchers.
Both such factors were in play when Marshall retired in 1908, and he did his best to ensure that the youthful Arthur Pigou got the job. Although Pigou was only 30 years of age at the time of the election of the chair, he had published much more extensively than Foxwell.
To Foxwell's chagrin and astonishment, Pigou's application was successful. [11] Pigou subsequently developed formalistic aspects of Marshallian theory, addressing welfare economics and other matters. Whatever the merits and justification of Pigou's appointment to the chair, it is clear in retrospect that the elevation of this brilliant, but very young, theoretical economist marked the end of the period of Cambridge's intensive engagement with the German historical school. The huge generational leap from Marshall to Pigou meant the loss of much of the knowledge and awareness of historicism. If Pigou knew anything much about the German historical school, it is not apparent in his writing. Still a tiny department, with no more than two dozen undergraduate students (Groenewegen, 1995, p. 553) , there were few to pass on an oral tradition of Marshallian connections with German historicism. Cambridge economics thus entered a period of relative intellectual isolation.
A pluralistic academy
Despite the historical caricatures of Robbins and others, the Marshallian period was one in which theorists and historicists worked alongside one another: there were differences of view but never a complete compartmentalisation, of viewpoints. For example, the young Ashleyeventually to become a guiding light of the British historical school in the early twentieth century -was critical of aspects of Marshall's Principles but concluded with the following significant tribute and concordant evaluation:
The Principles of Economics is a work worthy of its author's reputation, and of his position as the doyen of English economists. … It is the more welcome because it brings a message of conciliation to divergent schools, and it makes it possible for 'deductive' and 'historical,' 'scientific' and 'ethical' economists to work together in harmony. (Ashley, 1891, p. 489) A similarly pluralistic spirit was evident when Edgeworth, the leading neoclassical economist and first editor of the Economic Journal, opened the first volume:
The Economic Journal … will be open to writers of different schools. The most opposite doctrines may meet here as on a fair field. … Nor will it be attempted to prescribe the method, any more than the result, of scientific investigation. (Edgeworth, 1891, p. 1) We find clear and plentiful evidence of the implementation of this pluralist policy in the early volumes of the Economic Journal. There are signs of the influence of historical school thinking on British economics, including challenges to the atomistic individualism of some economic theorists. In the theory of consumption, for instance, there were attempts to go beyond atomistic individualism and develop the theory of interdependent and socialised consumers. Henry Cunynghame (1892) discussed the interdependence of consumer demands, thus setting the limits of the independent individual. Caroline Foley (1893) went much further. Starting from a recognition of the historical specificity of socio-economic structures and behaviour, she saw the need to study consumption as a real, historically conditioned and socially structured process. Pigou (1903 Pigou ( , 1913 subsequently made two attempts to incorporate interdependent and intersubjective aspects of consumer demand into neoclassical analysis. But Pigou (1913, p. 24) himself came to the conclusion that these attempts were 'wholly inadequate'. Not being readily formalised, these issues were eventually to slip off the agenda of mainstream economists in a later period (Mason, 1995; Fullbrook, 1998) .
The failure of the British historicists was in part due to their own conception of scientific advance. None of the leading figures of the British school was able to build an alternative methodology or theory, and they remained largely entrapped by an empiricist epistemology. Largely for this reason, and despite the persistent influence of a few individuals, the historical school failed to establish an enduring bridgehead in the British Isles.
Gradually pushed aside in academic argument, several members of the British historical school made their way into the discipline of economic history, embraced empiricism, and abandoned economic theory to the theorists. Crucially, the British historicists were overshadowed in the crucial encounters that occurred during the professionalisation of economics, and the establishment of distinct economics departments in several British universities in early part of the twentieth century. (Ashley, 1907 (Ashley, , 1924 (Ashley, , 1926 . Hobson (1902 Hobson ( , 1911 Hobson ( , 1914 openly embraced the metaphor of society-as-an-organism that was so central to German historicism. Fatefully, Hobson (1902) References economics in Britain as a separate discipline under the leadership of Marshall and his followers, and its separation from economic history, did not amount to a 'disintegration of political economy' as some have suggested. In truth, neither Marshall nor his predecessors had an adequately integrated system of political economy. If there was any 'integration' before (say) 1900 it was more to do with the fact that these subjects were often taught together, rather than the existence of any guiding overall framework or discipline of 'political economy'. Furthermore, the story concerning the relationship between economics and economic history is very different in Germany and the USA, and we cannot generalise from the British experience
